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POLICY DEBATES
Inclusive Growth in cities: a sympathetic critique
Neil Lee
ABSTRACT
The concept of ‘Inclusive Growth’ – a concern with the pace and pattern of growth – has become a new mantra in local
economic development. Despite enthusiasm from some policy-makers, others argue it is a buzzword which is changing
little. This paper summarizes and critiques this agenda. There are important unresolved issues with the concept of
Inclusive Growth, which is conceptually fuzzy and operationally problematic, has only a limited evidence base, and
reﬂects an overconﬁdence in local government’s ability to create or shape growth. Yet, while imperfect, an Inclusive
Growth model is better than one which simply ignores distributional concerns.
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INTRODUCTION
when you ask ﬁve economists to deﬁne the concept [of
Inclusive Growth], you will likely end up with six answers.
(Durán, 2015, n.p.)
Inclusive Growth is fast becoming a new mantra in
urban and regional policy. Its popularity has been driven,
in large part, by two linked trends. The ﬁrst is wide-
spread concern about the scale and consequences of
inequality (Cavanaugh & Breau, 2017). Global inequal-
ity has probably fallen over the past 30 years, mainly due
to progress in China. But inequality within countries has
tended to increase, with incomes rising for the already
afﬂuent while living standards stagnate for much of
the population (Benner & Pastor, 2015; The Resolution
Foundation, 2014; Summers & Balls, 2015). For
example, the average male full-time worker in the Uni-
ted States earned less in real terms in 2014 than in 1973
(Wessel, 2015); real pay levels in the UK fell between
2009 and the start of 2015 (Clarke & D’Arcy, 2016);
and even egalitarian Sweden has seen long-term
increases in inequality (Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2011).
Some have argued that growing inequality was one
cause of populist victories such as the UK referendum
on the European Union or Donald Trump’s election
as US president (Gordon, 2018; Lee, Morris, &
Kemeny, 2018; Shearer & Berube, 2017).
The second trend is the growing economic and political
importance of cities. Cities are increasingly seen as signiﬁ-
cant economic and political actors (Harrison, 2012;
Ianchovichina, Lundstrom, & Garrido, 2009; Storper,
2013). They are often where inequalities are starkest and
clearest, and their political importance is increasing, with
local government given new powers and responsibilities
to drive economic growth (Rodríguez-Pose & Gill,
2003). But while cities are now seen as ‘drivers of growth’,
this growth is not shared equally. Instead, the most success-
ful cities are often the most unequal (Glaeser, Resseger, &
Tobio, 2009; Lee, Sissons, & Jones, 2016), with growth
failing to trickle down to the poorest (Lee & Sissons,
2016; Lupton, Rafferty, & Hughes, 2016). This has led
policy-makers to question how they can ensure the beneﬁts
of growth are more widely shared.
In this context, Inclusive Growth has become one of the
most fashionable concepts in urban and regional policy. It
can be deﬁned, loosely, as a concern with both the pace and
pattern of growth. It became popular with economic devel-
opment policy-makers in the Global South in the late
2000s and is incorporated into the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals (United Nations, 2016). But following an
initial interest from national policy-makers in the Global
South, there has been a wave of interest from urban pol-
icy-makers internationally. In 2016, the OECD (2016,
p. 1) launched an ‘Inclusive Growth in Cities’ programme,
with ‘champion mayors’ signed up to show their commit-
ment to ‘tackling inequalities and promoting more inclusive
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economic growth in cities’. The World Bank (2017, p. 1)
has argued for a focus on ‘Inclusive Urbanisation’ for
‘Inclusive Growth’. Perhaps most importantly, the concept
was used in the New Urban Agenda which argued that
economic development should be achieved in a way that
achieved opportunity for all, because ‘private business
activity, investment and innovation are major drivers of
productivity, inclusive growth and job creation’ (United
Nations, 2016, p. 33).
The Inclusive Growth agenda has been taken up with
particular enthusiasm in the UK. Since the crisis of
2007–08, employment rates have been strong, but many
of the new jobs have been in low-paid self-employment
or temporary work (Green & Livanos, 2015) and wage
growth has been weak (Clarke & D’Arcy, 2016). At the
same time, a series of city deals were agreed as part of a rhe-
torical ‘devolution revolution’ (Ayres, Flinders, & Sand-
ford, 2018; Tomaney, 2016), and the idea that cities
should encourage Inclusive Growth has become a new
orthodoxy. There have been a series of high-proﬁle reports
published and research centres launched, including the
ﬁnal report of the Inclusive Growth Commission of the
Royal Society of Arts (RSA), a series of practice focused
reports by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (JRF) (e.g.,
Crisp et al., 2017; Green, Kispeter, Sissons, & Froy,
2017; Pike, Lee, MacKinnon, Kempton, & Iddawela,
2017) and an inﬂuential new research centre – the Inclusive
Growth Analysis Unit (IGAU) – established at the Univer-
sity ofManchester. The term has inﬂuenced policy: ‘Inclus-
ive Growth’ is one of the Scottish government’s goals in its
Agenda for Cities (Scottish Government, 2015), and cities
such as Leeds have introduced Inclusive Growth strategies
(Leeds City Council, 2017).
Yet, despite signiﬁcant policy interest, there has been
little critical analysis of the Inclusive Growth-in-cities
agenda. One exception is Turok (2010), but this predates
the current enthusiasm. The agenda is underpinned by
good intentions, and this has perhaps meant little critique.
But widespread use of the term ‘Inclusive Growth’ raises an
important question: is Inclusive Growth a genuinely useful
concept for economic development, or a buzzword, offering
policy-makers the promise of addressing two major pro-
blems – inequality and low growth – simultaneously, but
achieving little? This paper summarizes and critically
reviews the emerging work in this area. It investigates the
concept of Inclusive Growth, consider its strengths and
limitations, and in doing so consider ways in which the
concept might be best operationalized. While the scope
of the paper is global, it draws on examples from the UK,
where the agenda has been enthusiastically but uncritically
adopted.
This paper is sympathetic to the overall concept of
Inclusive Growth, which represents an important, clever
and overdue attempt to link economic development to dis-
tribution. However, it argues that Inclusive Growth
remains a fuzzy concept which is often vaguely and incon-
sistently deﬁned and is rapidly becoming a buzzword used
to signal progressive intent but with relatively little evi-
dence, to date, of actual implementation. When applied
to cities, it represents an overconﬁdence in the ability of
local government to stimulate growth, let alone shape it,
and there is still little evidence on what works. Cities
have an important role to play in Inclusive Growth but,
given their relatively limited powers and resources in
many places, national government still needs to play a lead-
ing role. Inclusive Growth is a potentially important
agenda, but the challenge will be delivery.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section
provides a brief history of the concept and its roots in the
development policy literature. The third section considers
various deﬁnitions and suggests that ‘Inclusive Growth’
can be considered a concept, a policy agenda but also a
buzzword. The fourth section develops a critique of the
concept based on its fuzziness, the challenges in operatio-
nalizing it and the problems of a policy agenda which offers
to solve two very difﬁcult problems simultaneously. The
ﬁfth section concludes with an evaluation of the concept,
and the argument that while it is not perfect, Inclusive
Growth is certainly an improvement on a narrow focus
on growth alone.
THE ROOTS OF INCLUSIVE GROWTH
There is, of course, a long history of debate about the
relationship between growth and the income distribution.
The dominant theoretical model has been the Kuznets
(1955) curve. This suggests that inequality initially
increases with development as structural change creates
new, well-paid jobs for a few workers; later, inequality
falls as more workers enter well-paid sectors and wages in
other sectors catch up. This model – in which inequality
is simply a side-effect of the level of development – was
associated with the trickle-down idea of development and
a view that growth is the ﬁrst step in poverty reduction
(Kanbur, 2000; Kakwani & Pernia, 2000). Yet, the basic
insight of the Kuznets curve seemed inconsistent with
the results of studies on the determinants of inequality
(Kanbur, 2000; Yin, 2004) and has been replaced with
the more nuanced idea that development could be achieved
in different ways and with different income distributions
(Ranieri & Ramos, 2013). As Yin (2004) notes, growing
inequality is not inevitable but the result of policy choices
made as part of national development strategies.
More recently, there has been concern that economic
growth was simply increasing inequality, without beneﬁt-
ing those on low incomes. In particular, Piketty’s (2014)
seminal work highlighted long-term growth in inequality,
determined by the balance between returns to capital and
the growth rate. According to Piketty, low growth would
lead to growing inequality as gains to capital earners out-
stripped those of labour. This story seems consistent with
the experience of many advanced economies. For example,
according to estimates by the Brookings Institution, in the
United States the average male full-time worker earned less
in 2014 than in 1973, a wage stagnation disguised in
national averages by signiﬁcant growth for top earners
(Wessel, 2015). In the UK, income inequality has fallen
since the 2008 recession, but it remains relatively unequal
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by OECD standards and inequality is expected to increase
over the long-term (Hood & Waters, 2017; OECD,
2011).
The literature on the distributional impact of growth
shows that while growth can beneﬁt those on low incomes,
this is not inevitable (Ravallion, 2015). Instead, the growth–
poverty relationship is dependent on the nature of growth, in
terms of its sectoral structure, and local context, such as
initial inequality (Ferreira, Leite, & Ravallion 2010). This
recognition that different types of ‘growth’ may have differ-
ent implications for poverty and the income structure led to
new concepts that sought to link growth with distribution.
In 1974, the World Bank published an inﬂuential study
Redistribution with Growth (Chenery, Ahluwalia, Duloy,
Bell, & Jolly, 1974) that made the case for distributional
considerations to be made more prominent in economic
development policies. It suggested that rather than assum-
ing increased incomes were of equal value in the economy,
as does gross domestic product (GDP), instead ‘distribu-
tional weights’ should be used to reﬂect the greater utility
of increased income for those on low incomes.
The most signiﬁcant concept in these debates was ‘Pro-
Poor Growth’, deﬁned as the difference between the pov-
erty reduction associated with any particular growth spell
and the poverty reduction had growth been equally distrib-
uted (Kakwani & Pernia, 2000). The literature on Pro-
Poor Growth had two goals: one technical, of developing
new indicators to focus policy on poverty reduction; one
economic, as a reaction to Washington Consensus policies
which were seen as having increased inequality, with little
impact on poverty (Grimm, Sipangule, Thiele, & Wiebelt,
2015; O’Connell, 2014). Pro-Poor Growth represented a
way of refocusing policy to ensure that the poor gained,
but without losing the focus on growth which most saw
as necessary. The concept gained in popularity through
the late 1990s until, in 2004, Ravallion (2004, p. 1)
noted that ‘almost everyone in the development community
is talking about “Pro-Poor Growth’”.
Yet, despite its popularity, there were some important
critiques of the idea of Pro-Poor Growth. Multiple deﬁ-
nitions used by different actors made it hard to track its
implementation: academics talked about it in precise, stat-
istical terms, but policy-makers often had a different set of
concepts in mind (Lopez, 2004). It was also relatively
narrow, and the focus on poverty meant those just above
the poverty line were ignored. In the late 2000s it was
replaced by a new concept, ‘Inclusive Growth’, as the domi-
nant term in international development (Grimm et al.,
2015). To show this switch, Figure 1 shows Google Trends
search data – a rough measure of interest – for ‘Inclusive
Growth’ and ‘Pro-Poor Growth’. In around 2004 – when
Ravallion suggested interest had peaked – Pro-Poor
Growth started to wane, with Inclusive Growth taking its
place. The latter concept spread quickly from the Global
South to the Global North, and then from national govern-
ments to cities and regions. This reﬂected a general quick-
ening of the spreading of policy concepts related to poverty,
with Peck (2011, p. 167) noting that the geographies of
anti-poverty policy became ‘jumbled up as never before’.
DEFINING ‘INCLUSIVE GROWTH’
Unsurprisingly, given the range of actors who use the term,
there is no universal deﬁnition of Inclusive Growth. In an
early deﬁnition, The World Bank (Ianchovichina et al.,
2009, p. 1) argue Inclusive Growth is both about ‘pace
Figure 1. Google Trends data: searches for ‘Inclusive Growth’ and ‘Pro-Poor Growth’.
Note: The height of each line gives an indication of the share of searches containing each term.
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and pattern’ of growth and these two components seem to
be generally important in deﬁnitions. For example, the
OECD (2014) argues that it is ‘a new approach to econ-
omic growth that aims to improve living standards and
share the beneﬁts of increased prosperity more evenly across
social groups’ (p. 8; added emphasis). Most deﬁnitions take
these two components as a starting point but broaden out,
adding extra components (Rauniyar & Kanbur, 2010). For
example, the Asian Development Bank (2018) adds an
additional element, social welfare, in its deﬁnition of
Inclusive Growth as: ‘high, sustainable growth to create
and expand economic opportunities, broader access to
these opportunities to ensure that members of society can
participate and beneﬁt from growth, and social safety
nets to prevent extreme deprivation’.
One common feature of many institutional deﬁnitions is
that they highlight not just the importance of Inclusive
Growth but also suggest that by making growth inclusive it
will reach untapped sections of the economy and so increase
overall output. For example, the G20 (2013, p. 1) – a repre-
sentative body of 20 large economies – suggested that:
Too many of our citizens have yet to participate in the econ-
omic global recovery that is underway. The G20 must strive
not only for strong, sustainable and balanced growth, but also
for a more inclusive pattern of growth that will better
mobilize the talent of our populations.
The World Economic Forum (WEF) (2015) has been
even more explicit, suggesting that ‘There is no inherent
trade-off in economic policy-making between the pro-
motion of social inclusion and that of economic growth
and competitiveness; it is possible to be pro-equity and
pro-growth at the same time’ (p. vii).
In this way, Inclusive Growth ceases to be about a
trade-off between equity and efﬁciency, but instead
suggests that by increasing equity, efﬁciency will also
improve (Ranieri & Ramos, 2013).
Table 1 gives a set of deﬁnitions used by both govern-
ment and non-governmental organizations. The important
point is that, as would be expected, the deﬁnitions vary. But
this leads to considerable scope in what falls under the con-
cept. In particular, it is unclear whether Inclusive Growth is
about reducing poverty (whether absolute or relative), redu-
cing inequality or something more general that does not
necessarily take living standards into account (some deﬁ-
nitions include the environment). The European Commis-
sion seems to deﬁne it as being about empowerment,
compared with the WEF’s view which is more about sec-
tors and poverty reduction. Deﬁnitions of institutions con-
sidering the developing world tend to focus on
opportunities for productive employment, but where
employment is already high, deﬁnitions are more about
the opportunity to participate in the economy.
Some deﬁnitions are sprawling or vague. Perhaps the
sharpest is that of the Scottish Government (2015, p. 1),
which narrowly suggest it is ‘growth that combines
increases in prosperity with greater equity, creates opportu-
nities for all and distributes the dividends of increased
prosperity fairly’. This reﬂects the importance of the con-
cept, as it does not seek to leave growth behind, but shapes
it to share the beneﬁts more widely (Ranieri & Ramos,
2013). Inclusive Growth is not just redistribution but
increasing output and ensuring that the increase is distrib-
uted in such a way as to be ‘inclusive’. However, the wide
range of deﬁnitions do little to set out how Inclusive
Growth should be achieved. ‘Growth’ is a relatively simple
concept, with clear, standardized and generally accepted
metrics. ‘Poverty reduction’ is less clear, but still has a
simple goal. But the deﬁnitions of ‘Inclusive Growth’ are
vaguer and so harder to operationalize.
Several studies have tried to measure Inclusive Growth.
The Brookings Institution (Shearer & Berube, 2017) has
deﬁned it statistically as three things: (1) the overall size
of the economy – measured through jobs, new ﬁrms and
output; (2) a measure of prosperity – productivity, average
wages or standard of living; and (3) some indicator of
narrowing economic disparity – either ‘general’ with
employment, middle-class wages, working poverty or
‘racial’ – outcomes for whites and people of colour and dis-
parities between different groups. Testing these across 100
US metro areas between 2010 and 2015, it found that only
four metro areas achieved ‘Inclusive Growth’, although
some metros did better by more limited deﬁnitions. In
Table 1. Deﬁnitions of Inclusive Growth.
Organization Deﬁnition
World Economic Forum
(WEF) (2015, p. 1)
[O]utput growth that is sustained
over decades, is broad-based
across economic sectors, creates
productive employment
opportunities for a great majority
of the country’s working age
population, and reduces poverty.
European Commission
(2010, p. 17)
Inclusive growth means
empowering people through
high levels of employment,
investing in skills, ﬁghting poverty
and modernizing labour markets,
training and social protection
systems so as to help people
anticipate and manage change,
and build a cohesive society.
Scottish Government
(2015, p. 1)
When we talk about Inclusive
Growth, we mean growth that
combines increases in prosperity
with greater equity, creates
opportunities for all and
distributes the dividends of
increased prosperity fairly.
Royal Society of Arts (RSA)
(2017, p. 5)
[E]nabling as many people as
possible to contribute to and
beneﬁt from growth.
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the UK, Beatty, Crisp, and Gore (2016) have an ‘Inclusive
Growth monitor’ for the 39 local enterprise partnership
(LEP) areas of England. This uses a richer set of 18 indi-
cators to show that while the richest places tend to be more
inclusive, there is no relationship over time.
Given these varying deﬁnitions, how can Inclusive
Growth be deﬁned? Lupton (2017, p. 1) argues that it is
a ‘long-term, multi-faceted agenda, not a single policy
initiative’ that is intended to shape policy across a range
of areas. Lupton and Hughes (2016, p. 6) suggest that:
the key idea is that if we want to have societies which are
more equal and have less poverty, we need to focus on the
economy and the connections between economic and social
policies. Strategies for investment and economic develop-
ment, productivity, skills, employment and wage regulation
must be integral to attempts to achieve greater fairness and
social inclusion. Likewise, enabling more people to partici-
pate fully in economic activity must be fundamental to devel-
oping prosperous and sustainable economies.
Within this conceptualization, Lupton and Hughes argue
there are different perspectives on what Inclusive Growth
actually is. For some, it is a ‘growth plus’ model. This is
arguably less radical, recognizing the need to connect a
wider range of residents to the beneﬁts and the potential
reverse causality, with greater inclusion leading to growth.
The other perspective is the ‘inclusive economy’ that devel-
ops from a critique of the inequality produced by the cur-
rent model and suggests changes in the economy to
service inclusive goals as a starting point. In this view,
growth is only one goal of the economy – other goals,
such as well-being or equality, should also be considered.
Another way of considering Inclusive Growth is to take
a broader view, situating the concept in current politics.
First, Inclusive Growth is a concept in the sense that Lupton
and Hughes discuss it, although, as they note, it is fuzzy
and subject to multiple meanings and deﬁnitions. Related
to this, frameworks are being developed, allowing this con-
cept to be applied, although these are still nascent. Second,
the concept underpins a new agenda in urban and regional
economic development. Inclusive Growth represents a
shared set of interests at the heart of which is the idea
that by linking growth and inclusion it is possible to recon-
cile the two. Organizations signed up to this generally do so
in a well-meaning way with progressive goals. They may
have different exact deﬁnitions, but their broad direction
is similar. However, a third way of understanding Inclusive
Growth is more critical: it can also be understood as a buzz-
word, applied to policy regardless of whether policy has
changed because of the policy agenda, and used simply to
signal intent. Like other buzzwords used in similar situ-
ations, it has multiple meanings and can be used to justify
different types of policy intervention (Cornwall & Brock,
2005). It allows policy to be branded with a certain set of
intentions and associations. However, the danger of a
buzzword is that it can lose meaning and so be applied to
pre-existing policies while changing little.
THE RATIONALE FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH
IN CITIES
Underpinning the Inclusive Growth-in-cities agenda are
two related, but distinct, sets of arguments: those outlining
why Inclusive Growth is a necessary approach, and those
for why cities are the appropriate scale. Most arguments
in the former group start with concerns about poverty
and inequality, followed by some assertion that economic
growth, without intervention, will either bypass or worsen
these problems. Any new high-technology cluster, business
park, skills policy or neighbourhood scheme will beneﬁt
some over others, regardless of its success. Yet, this is too
rarely considered by policy-makers (Pike, Rodríguez-
Pose, & Tomaney, 2007). As Green, Froy, Sissons, and
Kispeter (2017) argue, the Inclusive Growth agenda can
have a dual impact, both through new policies and in shap-
ing existing ones.
There are also strong pragmatic justiﬁcations for
attempts to link growth with inclusion. In less developed
countries the popularity of Inclusive Growth was partly
because smaller states made redistribution harder (Iancho-
vichina et al., 2009). Similarly, redistribution is rarely near
the top of public concerns in the Global North. In the UK,
for example, 30% of the population in 2014 agreed the gov-
ernment should spend more on welfare beneﬁts for the
poor; but 39% disagreed (NatCen, 2015). Inclusive
Growth helps avoid the electoral challenges of taxation
and redistribution. It is probably no coincidence that
Inclusive Growth has become important in the developed
world at a time when most countries face austerity and gov-
ernment is unwilling to spend on redistribution.
Inclusive Growth also highlights the potential beneﬁts of
reducing poverty and inequality for growth. Empirical evi-
dence, including a famous study from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) (Ostry, Berg, & Tsangarides,
2014), has shown that inequality can be a drag on growth.
Some of the signiﬁcant reports as part of the Inclusive
Growth agenda have made similar claims. For example,
the RSA’s Inclusive Growth Commission (2016, p. 4)
argued that ‘reducing inequality and deprivation can itself
drive growth’. Alongside this, Inclusive Growth highlights
the important links between economic and social policy.1
These links are clearest in employment and skills policies,
where investments in skills provision can achieve the dual
goal of increasing individual welfare while improving aggre-
gate economic success. But they extend across other policy
areas, including education, health services and social care.
By bringing these links onto the agenda, the agenda recog-
nizes the contribution of other public services to growth, but
also the relationships between society and the economy.
An important strength of the Inclusive Growth agenda is
that it offers the potential for a holistic approach to addres-
sing poverty and inequality (Lupton, 2017). By building
links across policy areas, Inclusive Growth can also help
marshal new resources to address poverty and inequality.
Policy-makers are unlikely to give up their focus on growth:
it is the dominant discourse, public institutions are focused
Inclusive Growth in cities: a sympathetic critique 5
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on it, and few politicians could run successfully on an anti-
growth agenda. In linking the growth agenda with an inclus-
ive one, the agenda can attract new resources and help
organizations which have a longstanding focus on growth
to address a new target. In doing so, the Inclusive Growth
agenda helps mobilize new resources to the challenge of
reducing poverty and inequality. It takes a policy goal with
widespread interest and considerable resources (growth)
and uses it to address an issue for which public support
has sometimes waned (inclusion).
A second set of arguments focus speciﬁcally on why cities
should be the focus of Inclusive Growth. There has been a
‘global trend to devolution’ (Rodríguez-Pose & Gill,
2003), with subnational governments in many parts of the
world being given new powers and responsibilities. This
trend has been most clear in cities – with a range of popular
books highlighting the economic importance of the urban
area, and their crucial economic role (e.g., Storper, 2013).
Structural change and globalization have, paradoxically,
made cities seem particularly important economic actors.
Having been partially resurgent from post-industrial shift,
cities were then in a position to focus on the distribution
of the beneﬁts (Lupton et al., 2016).
Approaches focused on cities also reﬂect the fact that
these are where inequality is most obvious (Glaeser et al.,
2009; Lee et al., 2016). Scholars have expressed concern
about this inequality for some time, while high-proﬁle
urban politicians have successfully run for ofﬁce on anti-
inequality mandates, most famously Bill De Blasio,
Mayor of New York. Related to this is a third factor: the
increased dissatisfaction of some urban electorates with
the anti-poverty strategies of national policy-makers.
According to proponents, there are signiﬁcant practical
justiﬁcations for a local approach to Inclusive Growth.
Growth is context speciﬁc and the obsession with GDP
ignores factors such as the composition of growth (by sec-
tor, occupation or other factors) which may help growth
translate to improved living standards. Turok (2010)
suggests that urban approaches provide multiple beneﬁts
for Inclusive Growth: (1) they allow new approaches to
be developed and trialled in a local area, with the successful
ones then used elsewhere; (2) a city focus allows a uniﬁed
approach with different local actors engaging towards a
uniﬁed goal; (3) better targeting of groups who may not
be beneﬁting from increased living standards; (4) develop-
ing community potential; (5) coordination of policy
agendas; and (6) because the composition of growth
tends to be local, they allow tailored policy to be developed
for a speciﬁc local context. Some argue that cities can come
up with new approaches to Inclusive Growth. For example,
the OECD’s Angel Guerria suggested – when launching
the OECD’s work on Inclusive Growth – that:
If we are to succeed, then we have to ensure that cities are at
the heart of the ﬁght. After all, while it is in cities where the
pernicious effects of inequalities are most acutely felt, it is also
in cities that the most innovative and effective solutions can
be brought to bear.
(OECD, 2016, p. 2)
Yet, while cities clearly have a role to play in developing
new ideas, this role is inevitably limited compared with
that of national government. Despite widespread concern
about inequality, local policy-makers often have only
limited powers to address it directly (Glaeser et al., 2009;
Lee et al., 2016). However, local policy-makers have
more powers to stimulate growth, and the Inclusive
Growth agenda is a way of using these to address wider
social challenges.
THE INCLUSIVE GROWTH AGENDA:
LIMITATIONS
What is problematic about the Inclusive Growth-in-cities
agenda? It seems hardhearted to critique such a well-mean-
ing agenda, but there are problems both with the concept of
Inclusive Growth and its practical application. In particu-
lar, its fuzziness makes it hard to operationalize; it remains
unclear what works in achieving it; and it reﬂects an over-
conﬁdence in the ability of subnational governments to
shape their local economies. This leads to concerns it is
simply a placebo, promising to address two difﬁcult issues –
low growth and high inequality – but doing little except
make policy-makers feel better about themselves.
Fuzzy concepts and unfocused policy
In a classic study, Markusen (1999, p. 702) set out the pro-
blem of ‘fuzzy concepts’ where ‘researchers may believe they
are addressing the same phenomena but may actually be
targeting quite different ones’. Given its multiple deﬁ-
nitions, Inclusive Growth falls into this category.
Deﬁnitions vary and, while all tend to be based around
the need for growth to provide opportunities for all, are
often sprawling, including policy areas which extend far
from the basic concept (Green, Kispeter, et al., 2017).
Deﬁnitions often put almost any progressive policy goal –
quality of life, health, jobs, environment and community
– under the Inclusive Growth banner. The concept also
has overlaps with the more speciﬁc notion of Inclusive
Innovation (George, McGahan, & Prabhu, 2012). But it
is often deﬁned according to the prior interests or beliefs
of the interpreter, like a conceptual Rorschach test.
One fuzzy issue is spatial scale. The literature on Inclus-
ive Growth in cities tends to consider two related but dis-
tinct goals: inequality between and within places. For
example, the European Commission (2010) considers ter-
ritorial cohesion as a key aspect and the RSA’s Inclusive
Growth Commission (2016, p. 6) explicitly argued for
the need to address ‘inequalities in opportunities between
different parts of the country and within economic geogra-
phies’. Yet, both goals are problematic. Addressing
inequalities between different parts of the county is basically
the goal of regional policy. Policy-makers have worked to
improve regional policy for more than 50 years, but dispar-
ities remain large. If the Inclusive Growth agenda helps
attract more resources for this goal, or improved ways of
doing things, then it can be positive here. But the danger
is that Inclusive Growth simply becomes a label for doing
things which were not done particularly well or would
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have been done anyway. Addressing inequalities within
cities or regions is also difﬁcult. If new resources were
found, it is not clear what the balance of priorities should
be: should money be focused at inner-cities or wider
areas? Any new agenda is likely to fall victim to the long-
standing problems of competition between different local
government areas and agencies (Gordon, 1999).
Another unanswered question about Inclusive Growth
is: should it focus speciﬁcally on the relationship between
growth and inclusion or be a broader concept? It is hard
to operationalize the central idea at the heart of the Inclus-
ive Growth agenda – that growth and inclusion are linked.
There are some obvious areas that sit between the two, such
as skills or labour market policy. But it is difﬁcult to have a
strategy that consists solely of these overlapping issues,
meaning that strategies focused on Inclusive Growth
often also include policy areas that might be more appropri-
ately focused on growth or inclusion separately. For
example, the Inclusive Growth Strategy of Leeds, a city
in the North of England, focused on 12 ‘Big Ideas’, policy
areas under which other policy is made. But there are clear
tensions in a strategy such as this: some Big Ideas, such as
skills, have a clear link to Inclusive Growth; others such as
health, relate largely to social policy with little link made to
growth; others seem parts of a standard economic develop-
ment strategy with no attempt to make them ‘inclusive’.
Of course, it matters little if the concept is erratically
deﬁned, so long as it is still used to shape policy in an effec-
tive manner. But deﬁnitions matter: they enable measure-
ment, and measurement is a crucial tool in targeting
policy, focusing ﬁnances and ensuring effective evaluation.
Pro-Poor Growth was reasonably clearly deﬁned, yet there
were still debates about how it could be achieved (Grimm
et al., 2015). Inclusive Growth is broader and harder to
pin down, making it even harder to focus resources on it.
Without some sort of focus, any new resources that come
with the wave of interest in Inclusive Growth will be spread
thinly and risk having little impact. If Inclusive Growth is
used too loosely it starts to lose meaning and, eventually,
usefulness.
Unless it has a clear meaning, Inclusive Growth can
become a policy buzzword – a label applied to policies
that might have happened anyway or which are some dis-
tance from the initial concept. One example of this is the
concept of ‘poverty reduction’, which began as a progressive
goal but was eventually applied loosely to policies with little
direct impact on poverty (Cornwall & Brock, 2005). There
are early signs that Inclusive Growth is being used as such a
buzzword, with strategies making reference to Inclusive
Growth but little different than they would have been if
the term had not become fashionable. One example is
the UK’s Greater Birmingham and Solihull LEP, a body
tasked with furthering economic development in the
region. The LEP has the goal of achieving ‘smarter, more
sustainable and more inclusive growth’ in the region
(Greater Birmingham and Solihull LEP, 2016, p. 5).
However, the body’s economic strategy is narrowly focused
on the traditional goal of reducing unemployment. In this
case, Inclusive Growth resembles a buzzword, used by
policy-maker with little practical effect, rather than a gen-
uine attempt to shift policy. If Inclusive Growth had a more
precise deﬁnition, it would be harder for this to happen.
What works in local Inclusive Growth?
The conceptual fuzziness of Inclusive Growth makes it
hard to produce useful policy frameworks: fuzzy concepts
lead to unfocused policy. In particular, it is not clear what
the goal of Inclusive Growth should be. If Inclusive
Growth is aimed at reducing inequality, it may distract
attention from investments which increase overall welfare,
but where the beneﬁts are skewed (Ianchovichina et al.,
2009). Growth can be socially beneﬁcial even when it is
not inclusive: China’s economic success in the 1990s and
2000s reduced poverty in 500 million people, but, as
inequality rose, it was not necessarily ‘inclusive’ (Ranieri
& Ramos, 2013).
It is not yet clear if the Inclusive Growth-in-cities
agenda has led to meaningful change, in developed
countries at least. Many of the policies around Inclusive
Growth may have happened anyway. Skills are often
cited as being a vital part of Inclusive Growth, but this
has always been a priority for some policy-makers (if not
all). So it is not clear whether integration of these things
into new Inclusive Growth strategies is a change on what
would have happened without the agenda. In one study
of the policy impact of the agenda, Sissons, Green, and
Broughton (2017) consider the case of UK devolution.
They show that cities are focused on supply-side interven-
tions in the labour market, with little evidence of a deeper
integration of Inclusive Growth into city strategies.
One problem is that the evidence base on what works in
making growth inclusive is still weak. This is a problem in
the developing world where, despite the concept having
been used for some time, there is little evidence on the
appropriate policy mix to make growth inclusive (Dollar,
Kleineberg, & Kraay, 2016). This problem is far worse in
the developed world where the concept has only recently
become popular. An evidence base is developing, however
(Benner & Pastor, 2015; Beel, Jones, Rees Jones, & Esca-
dale, 2017). In the UK, institutions such as the Joseph
Rowntree Foundation (JRF) and the RSA have started to
produce frameworks. One such framework is that produced
by the IGAU at the University of Manchester, which out-
lines seven pillars of inclusive local economic growth. But it
takes time for evidence to be developed and used by policy,
and the policy-makers are currently running ahead of the
evidence base. The danger is that strategies are rolled out
before we know whether or not they will work.
The politics of Inclusive Growth
Another set of critiques focus on the political use of Inclus-
ive Growth. The concept implies that trade-offs can be
avoided, with no tension between growth-focused policy
and that addressing inequality. But this means that redistri-
bution, often the most effective way of addressing poverty,
becomes secondary as a tool for raising living standards.
This is explicit in justiﬁcations of the concept in a World
Bank paper on Inclusive Growth. Ianchovichina et al.
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(2009, p. 2) argue ‘the focus is on productive employment
rather than on direct income redistribution, as a means of
increasing incomes for excluded groups’. The concept
grew in importance in the developing world, where state
income was not large enough to allow redistribution. As
with Pro-Poor Growth, Inclusive Growth has become
popular in response to a controversial set of policies – the
Washington Consensus and Austerity respectively
(Leschke, Theodoropolou, Watt, & Lehndorff, 2012) –
in cities, which often lack the resources of national govern-
ment. But it raises the following question: is it is a prag-
matic attempt to do something in these circumstances or
a buzzword used to avoid hard choices in periods of
austerity?
The most important critique of the Inclusive Growth-
in-cities agenda is that cities have only limited ability to
shape either growth or inclusion in their local area. Cities
often lack the powers they need to make growth inclusive.
Turok (2010) argues Inclusive Growth can only succeed
with ‘active state involvement in market mechanisms’ –
but while powers vary, cities in countries such as the UK
tend to lack powers in areas that would be considered
basic at a national level, such as skills. Much of the new
Inclusive Growth-in-cities agenda reﬂects the argument
and challenges made by those arguing more generally for
devolution of power to local areas. Yet, this agenda suffered
from signiﬁcant problems. Devolution of power to subna-
tional areas is no guarantee of economic success (Pike,
Rodríguez-Pose, Tomaney, Torrisi, & Tselios, 2012).
The Inclusive Growth agenda is no less problematic.
There are always concerns that cities or regions in areas
that have experienced signiﬁcant growth tend to be the
most unequal (Lee et al., 2016). Afﬂuent places tend to
have more resources to address their social challenges,
and it is likely in these places that the agenda will have
most success. It is harder to see how the agenda can succeed
in low-growth cities or regions without national interven-
tion. In countries such as the UK, these challenges are com-
pounded by the signiﬁcant reductions in public spending,
with this austerity policy disproportionately reducing fund-
ing for local government (Pike et al., 2017). Cities have few
powers to make growth Inclusive, and their funding is, in
many cases, falling.
Even if cities did have the powers to ‘drive’ growth, it
would be hard for them to do so. National government
tends to have the major powers to shape the economy, ran-
ging from levers of the macroeconomy to demand-side pol-
icy. Even with these powers, growth is difﬁcult. This
problem is much worse at a local level. Cities already devote
considerable attention to achieving growth, whether or not
it is inclusive. But the pursuit of growth is often futile, as
the impact of urban policy on city economies is inevitably
marginal compared with the impact of wider economic
change (Champion & Townsend, 2011). The processes
of technological change and globalization that have prob-
ably contributed to the uneven income distributions in
many countries are global trends. While national govern-
ment can certainly mitigate against these trends, city gov-
ernments tend to have fewer powers. Many of the
problems of poverty and inequality faced by cities are the
result of city policy (Lupton & Hughes, 2016). City gov-
ernments cannot magic up economic growth, and they
will ﬁnd it even harder to shape it.
CONCLUSIONS
There is now signiﬁcant momentum around the Inclusive
Growth-in-cities agenda. The concept was initially popular
in development, before spreading to countries and then
cities in the developed world. It has parallels with past
attempts to reconcile growth and equity, such as Pro-
Poor Growth, in that it has come about at a time of auster-
ity, with growing concerns about inequality and political
differences between cities and national governments. The
Inclusive Growth agenda is a long-overdue recognition
that urban economic development has tended to focus on
growth, with little consideration of who beneﬁts. It has
drawn new organizations into the debate on inequality,
has mobilized new resources and has already had an impact
on policy. Perhaps most importantly, it may be shaping
pre-existing policies in a way that means they now consider
distribution (Green, Froy, et al., 2017), and it can do this
without the painful and difﬁcult challenge of redistribution.
Yet, as the agenda becomes more mainstream in local
economic development, it faces signiﬁcant challenges, not
least that it overstates the extent to which city governments
can drive growth and shape its distribution, that policy fra-
meworks are still developing, and that the evidence base on
‘what works’ is poor. Inclusive Growth is a fuzzy concept,
with the beneﬁts and potential costs that entails. Because
it is so hard to disagree with the notion of Inclusive
Growth, the danger is that it becomes a sort of placebo:
helping policy-makers feel they are doing the right thing,
but without leading to meaningful change. And as the
Inclusive Growth agenda gains in popularity, it does so
in a challenging context. UK local government is experien-
cing long-term cuts in its budgets, with the austerity pol-
icies of central government having a disproportionate
impact on local government (Fitzgerald & Lupton, 2015;
Pike, Coombes, O’Brien, & Tomaney, 2018). The Inclus-
ive Growth agenda is only a sticking plaster over these deep
cuts.
But the Inclusive Growth agenda does not have to be
perfect, it simply has to be better than the alternatives.
Given the political challenges faced by any form of redistri-
bution, the continued desire for growth and the public per-
ception that reducing the national debt should be a policy
priority, it is hard to see what the alternatives are for
urban policy-makers who lack the ﬁnance or powers to
redistribute. In the end, success for Inclusive Growth as a
policy agenda may not be in the new policies and frame-
works, but in the way existing programmes and policies
are reconﬁgured to consider distributional considerations
(Green, Froy, et al., 2017). The Inclusive Growth agenda
highlights the importance of distribution, and – in some
respects – the trade-offs necessary in policy-making
(OECD, 2014). Rather than a single, focused policy
initiative, it can be better understood as a wider agenda
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(Lupton et al., 2016). It might be that this agenda causes
policy-makers to reﬂect and adapt policies across a range
of areas to consider their potential impact on low-income
groups. In doing so, the fuzziness of the concept may actu-
ally be helpful as it is both politically acceptable and can be
used by multiple agencies. The precise deﬁnition of Inclus-
ive Growth is fuzzy, but the overall goal is clear.
The challenge for the Inclusive Growth agenda is to
prove that it is achieving change. Similar policy agendas
have offered the ‘allure of optimism and purpose’ but
have led to relatively little positive change (Cornwall &
Brock, 2005, p. 1044), and early evidence suggests this
may be true of Inclusive Growth (Sissons et al., 2017).
To do this, the frameworks being developed need to be
reﬁned and developed. While these provide a useful stra-
tegic overview, they need to be ﬂeshed out with evidence
on the actual interventions that help translate intentions
into outcomes. Initiatives such as the IGAU at the Univer-
sity of Manchester have helped to do this. But evaluation of
policy takes time, and the beneﬁts of the agenda may not be
apparent for a while. The challenge for proponents of the
agenda is to maintain momentum while reﬁning concepts
and developing realistic frameworks that work but doing
so without offering more than local policy-makers can rea-
listically achieve.
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